Resumo o paper discutc tres aspectos da resistencia dos paises em cumprirem as mctas dos pIanos de cstabiliza<;oes formuladas pelo FMI. Primeiro, uma definic;ao para urn indicador dcste tipo e aprcscntada. A releva-ncia do fenomeno da re sistencia coloea em duvida supostos impactos que os programas do FM! trazem conformc sugerido em Pastor (1987) .
Introduction.
Numerous IMF stabilization plans have been attempted in the last decades without success. Attention has concentrated on the ad equacy of the models underlying the policy measures. Less emphasis has been placed on the problems of implementation of the different plans. However, few stabilization programs, if any, were conducted as originally designed. Authorities may announce the appropriate measures but they rarely have the will, or the power, to undertake them.
The objective of this paper is to address three aspects of the resistance phenomenon. First, one would like to defi ne and measure it in a strict way. Second, search for the fa ctors affecting resistance. And lastly, derive some policy implications.
This final point can be further divided into two policy issues. At the international level, conditionality enforcement is the major question at stake. Unless countries follow the stabilization measures designed by multilateral organizations like the IMF and the World Bank such institutions may fail to solve the moral hazard problem involved in a relation between a sovereign debtor and a private cred itor.! Moreover the very assessment of the effects of the stabilization plans promoted by such institutions have to be reconsidered. Conclu sions about the effect of IMF programs in LDCs like in Pastor (1987) are subject to the criticism that the original plans were simply not implemented.
At the national level, one worries about possible measures which could eliminate or at least reduce resistance. As shall be argued, later the structural nature of the fa ctors behind the phenomenon docs not allow much leeway for policy action in the short run.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides evidence of resistance to IMF stabilization plans. Particular attention is given to the Brazilian historical experience which illustrates well the resistance to stabilization including resistance to non IMF plans. This last point is important because it corroborates the assumption that resistance to stabilization is a more general phenomenon associated with structural characteristics of the economy and relatively independent from the degree of adequacy of the particular policies prescribed.
Section III provides a framework for addressing the above ques tions. It contains a cross-section study applying a logit model and associating the likelihood of resistance to structural characteristics of the LDC economics. The comparison between a simple and a nested logit structures provides a framework for testing the effectiveness of conditionality enforcement. A last section underscores the major re sults and conclusions.
2. Evidence of the resistance to IMF programs.
2.1. Disobedience to IMF stabilization programs.
Resistance to stabilization seems to be a widespread phenome non. The evidence about non-compliance to IMF programs is abun dant. According to Goldstein (1986, p.8 ) "previous staff reviews of stand-by and extended arrangements suggests that most policy mea sures arc implemented as planned in only one-third to two-thirds of the programs." According to Remmer (1986, Ta ble 1) , only in 60% of IMF standby arrangements for the period 1954-84 of 9 Latin Amer ican countries has a reduction in the government deficit! gdp ratio been observed and in only 34% of the cases have all three indicators been red uced. In one-third of the cases the rate of growth of domestic credit has not been reduced. 2 This fact seems to be the most relevant since domestic credit control is the central part of an IMF program3 • Sachs (1988, p.25-27) cites additional evidence of lack of com pliance. According to Beveridge and Kelly (1980) and Doc (1983) , the rate of success in achieving fiscal targets is low and according to Haggard (1985) noncompliance has plagued the majority of the Extended Fund Facility programs. Edwards (1989, p.26-32) reports a low rate of compliance for the 34 programs approved in 1983. In more than half of the cases in 1984-85 and in 45% in 1983 , countries failed to comply with the domestic credit targets. 4 Part of the fa ilure in meeting the targets may in fact be due to the inadequacy of the IMF programs and not to the authorities' lack 'For details sec Remmer (1986, p.18-21) . 30liveira (1989} chap. 2) contains a description of a typical IMF plan. · See Edwards (1989, Table 4 ). of will. But the frequency of the phenomenon in such heterogeneous country sets and different time periods should at least serve as a warning to the potential seriousness of the resistance problem.
A comprehensive report of LDC's resistance to non IMF plans is out of the scope of this study. As argued elsewhere, a closer look at the Brazilian experience helps illustrate resistance to both IMF and non-IMF plans and suggests some working hypotheses for a cross country study.5 2.2. Aspects of the Brazilian resistance to stabilization.
As discussed in more detail in Oliveira (1989) , four aspects of the Brazilian resistance to stabilization are noteworthy in this study: i) Problems of implementation have not been peculiar to IMF pro grams; the phenomenon has been observed throughout the last decades b,; I.h in the case of IMF and non IMF plans. ii) political regimes have not been associated in any simple way with the willingness to stabilize; iii) Brazil has avoided resorting to the Fund unless the foreign exchange situation becomes unbearable; lack of alternatives to foreign exchange crises have been the major reason for authori ties to sign high-conditionality agreements. It is interesting how despite the subsequent disobedience, Brazil tended to resort to the Fund almost every time the country faced a critical balance of-payments crisis. But once the negative effects of demand reducing policies were fclt administrations of different political persuasions have reacted similarly by dropping the stabilization priorities. iv) the degree of influence of the IMF has varied widely over the last decades. During the 1950s and the 1960s the Fund had some power to interfere in the design of stabilization policies in 1961 and to less extent during 1964-66. After a long period of absence in the Brazilian policymaking, the IMF was particularly influential in both the design and the monitoring of macro policies applied during 1983-84. Two aspects are of particular interest here. First, a greater role of the IMF in policy design has not assured obedience. Second, the Brazilian case suggests that high-conditionality programs of a same 5For a historical overview of the Brazilian easel See Oliveira (1989) . country undertaken in distant time periods as in Remmer (1986) or in Pastor (1987) are hardly comparable in terms of resistance because they are likely to involve different degrees of influence of the Fund.
3. The causes of resistance.
In order to test the rc!evance of the factors explaining resistance a Logit Inodel was fitted to data from 43 LDCs. The objective is to find how a set of country-specific variables affect the odds of resistance to IMF policies. A brief discussion of the dependent and independent variables is in the following while Table 1 summarizes the relevant information about definitions, proxies, and notation used. A few methodological remarks are made at the end of the section.
The dependent variable
In order to answer the question of how pervasive resistance is a strict definition of the latter is necessary. The dependent variable in Berg and Sachs (1988) does not fulfill such condition.6 Given the inaccessibility to the original letters of intention, the focus on the before-after behavior of common IMF policy tools is justifiable. However, three qualifications apply to the evidence contained in Rem mer (1986) . First, it includes programs undertaken in a long period during which the degree of influence of the Fund may have changed signifi cantly for a number of countries. The Brazilian expe rience reported in the last section is illustrative in that regard.7
Second, it is better to consider periods during which member countries undergo IMF plans rather than individual programs as the relevant units of comparison. Two reasons justify this choice: i) some programs are only formal (eg, the Brazilian programs from 1967 to 1972 are included in Remmer's sample); ii) there might be policy inside lags which are more likely to be corrected for if a longer period is taken. This goes along with the later discussion about the causes for resistance, which will be assumed to be related to a large extent to the countries' economic and political structures and not exclusively 6 The authors developed a probit model for the discrete variable indicating whether countries rescheduled their debts and a tohit for the truncated variable indicating the value of the countries' debt asset in the secondary market. 1Prograrns in the mid-sixtics, for instance, implied less conditionality than in 1983-84. to the program features or the circumstances under which it was implemented.
Third, it is more appropriate to fo cus on the evolution of the domestic credit per unit of output. Since the demand for credit is expected to shift in during recessive periods, the mere verification of the reduction in the rate of growth of domestic credit as in Remmer (1986) is not sufficient evidence for the contractionary nature of the credit policy. Table 2 contains a classification of the degree to which they im plemented IMF high-conditionality agreements. It incorporates the previous concerns about the way implementation of IMF programs should be measured. A country was called "resistant" (R) if the do mestic credit per unit of output (dey) increased during the IMF years with respect to the period immediately previous to the IMF agree ment. It was called "obedient" (0) otherwise.s The results confirm the low degree of implementation of the IMF policies. Of the 60 countries which signed IMF agreements in the period 1979-86, more than half (34) resisted in the above sense while only 26 obeyed.
The above evidence casts doubt on the effects of the IMF pro grams presented in Pastor (1987, Chapter 4) and Pastor (1987) . Ac cording to them, IMF programs would tend to have a number of macro impacts among which the reduction in the labor share in in come would be the most emphasized. Table 3 contains a summary of the relevant purported effects contrasting Pastor's conclusions with those of the IMF.
However if resistance is in fa ct important, those effects -both Pastor's and the ones fo und by the IMF studies -can not be at tributed to the IMF programs. This is what Ta ble 4 aims at demon strating. A first aspect to point out has already been remarked with respect to Rcmmer's data; the time interval considered is too long with the average year range for each country being 18.2. As the Brazilian experience would suggest, the degree of influence of the IMF in the countries of the sample are likely to have changed signifi cantly during the relevant time intervals. Moreover applying Pastor's definition of program period as well as the concept of resistance of 8When there was more than one non-contiguous IMF contracts the weighted average of the rates of growth of the different periods was taken. The shares of the money disbursed in each period were used as weights. Table 2 , one concludes that in 61 of the 86 observations, the countries pertaining to Pastor's sample resisted in the sense of this section (see Table 4 ). Thus the presumed macro changes can not be interpreted as consequences of programs which were simply not implemented.
The choices involved
The discrete nature of the measurement of resistance presented in Table 1 as well as the element of policy option between the two alternatives suggest that a qualitative-choice model like the Logit can be useful.9
The evidence about the high frequency of implementational problems with the IMF programs suggests that resorting to the Fund need not mean obeying the IMF prescriptions. Then there arc at least t"Wo decisions to be made by the country's policy makers. First, go to tbe Fund or not which is indicated by the binary variable i mj.
irn j = 1 if the country signed a high-conditionality agreement with the IMF during 1979-85 and imj = 0 otherwise. Second, resist the IMF policies or not (as depicted by the behavior of the unit domestic credit during the program period), which is expressed by r, r = 1 if the country resisted in the above sense and r = 0 otherwise.
The above two discrete dependent variables are indicated in Ta ble 1. Integrating the two decisions allows for a third trichotomous variable y, y = 1 if the country did not go to the Fund (N F), y = 2 if the country resisted to the IMF policies (R), y = 3 if the country obeyed to the IMF policies (0).
The independent variables: a few working hypotheses
The following variables are going to be submitted to test: income concentration (ic), recession aversion (g), fiscal weakness of the state (ty), degree of openness of the economy (xy), and the magnitude of the external shock (b).10 The rationale of each one of them is 9The logit model will be discussed later in the text. See Oliveira (1989) for more details. lOSee the appendix and Ta ble 3 for the proxies used for each one of the above discussed in the following.
Income concentration (ic)
Any stabilization program implies some extent of income redis tribution in a relatively short period of time. l l Therefore, it is crucial that sectors negotiate the sacrifice shares. The greater the initial in come inequality, the greater the intolerance of the lower classes to short term sacrifi ces and, therefore, the more difficult it is to achieve a social consensus towards stabilization.
This general emphasis can be motivated theoretically in differ ent ways. Distributional pressures were always emphasized as a major driving fo rce for the inflationary phenomenon in the ECLA studies; to the extent that they bear relation to the degree of initial income inequality this tradition could be invoked to introduce income Con centration as an argument here. Alesina and Drazen (1989) show how delays in stabilization can be attributed to the "war of attrition" of rational agents trying to avoid the presumed disproportionate burdens of a stabilization pack age. In their model greater income dispersion can be associated with longer delays.1 2 Berg and Sachs (1988) have shown empirically how income in equality is associated with the probability of a country facing a debt crisis. Although they have a different dependent variable and despite other differences with this study, the motivation for using income concentration as an explanatory variable is similar, namely the dif ficulties which large inequalities impose to the political system and particularly to macro discipline.
Recession aversion (g)
To the extent that the memory of systematic expansion consol idates, fast growth becomes a tradition. Such a phenomenon dimin ishes the social tolerance to even short periods of recession which make it harder (if not impossible) for policy makers to stabilize. Fishlow (1986) has provided an argument of this type for the stavariables. 11 See Demery and Addison (1987) for the major issues related to the impacts of stabilization upon income distribution. 12See Alesina and Drazcn (1989, Proposition 5) .
bilization failures of the seventies and of eighties in Brazil.
Fiscal weakness of the state (ty)
Stabilization requires resource transfers and a lesser degree of utilization of the "seignorage" power. When the state lacks a solid fiscal basis it fa ces difficulties in promoting the necessary income transfers as well as in reducing the inflationary financing.
Degree of openness (xy)
The more open the economy the smaller the possibility of diver gence between internal an external prices. Therefore, resistance to stabilization wo uld be harder in a relatively open economy. Moreover, for highly-indebted countries the greater openness allows for larger potential gains fr om a cooperative solution with the creditorsP
Magnitude of the external shock (b)
The greater the relative importance of the external shocks to explain the macroeconomic problems of the country, the greater the difficulty and lesser the willingness to stabilize. Table 1 contains all the variables discussed before as well as a few others mentioned in the literature. The political regime (pr) has been associated with resistance to IMF programs in part of the marxist literature such as Payer (1974) , Phillips (1983) and Pastor (1987) . Berg and Sachs (1988) in turn have suggested that a large agricultural sector tends to contribute to political stability playing an inverse role of the income concentration variable discussed before; they have also found good results for income per capita which would proxy the degree of economic and institutional development.14 Before turning to the empirical evidence a few methodological as pects deserve comment. First, the independent variables are chooser specific (Le., country specifi c) and not choice specifi c. The degree of heterogeneity of the LDCs is large. Given the widely different struc tures, countries show varying levels of resistance. It is not the case that policy makers have a menu of alternatives among which they choose the optimal set of choices in terms of national welfare maxi mization. The degree of uncertainty involved as well as the complex ity of the decision process within the state probably preclude such optimization. The assumption here is that LDCs'authorities face severe structural constraints, obliging them to follow certain policy patterns.
IS
Second, although the study focuses only on the resistance to the IMF programs for which the necessary data is available, more general conclusions may be drawn. This is due to the structural nature of the resistance factors invoked above. Since most of the explanatory variables will not change in a short period of time, their effect is likely to be present in other types of stabilization programs.
Third, the fact that the political regime hypothesis is deempha sized in favor of the variables proposed above docs not mean that political and institutional factors may not be of great importance. However their depiction requires greater sophistication in the con struction of adequate proxies and is beyond the scope of this paper.16
The empirical evidence of the resistance to the IMF from the simple logits This section contains evidence about the relative importance of the factors discussed previously using a simple structure. A discussion of the latter will be omitted at this point since this model can be viewed as a particular case of the nested logit which shall be presented in detail later .17
Going to the Fund diminishes the policy makers' degree of free15This absence of a representative agent provides another clement of affinity with the type of model developed by Alesina and Drazen (1989) . 1 6 Cukierman and others (1989) have constructed an indicator of political polar iza.tion and associated it to reliance on seignorage. With respect to the union structure, a possible discrete independent variable could be constructed from a classification of the type contained in Amadeo and Banuri (1989) . 1 7Major references for the logit model are Macfadden (1973) , Maddala (1983) , and Amemiya (1985) .
dam; it is therefore reasonable to assume that national authorities would avoid resorting to high-conditionality agreements unless the Balance of Payment BOP situation becomes critical. Ta ble 5a pro vides evidence about the decision to resort to the Fund.IS As the Brazilian historical experience suggests, countries go to the Fund when the BOP situation becomes unsustainable. Since the import coverage (mr) is a measure of liquidity, it serves as the proxy for the short term condition of the BOP accounts. As Ta ble 5a shows, a significant coefficient with the expected sign is obtained.19
As we turn to the fa ctors affecting the odds for a country's re sisting IMF policies (R), other motivations seem to prevail. Income concentration (ic) and the magnitude of the external shock (b) are the relevant variables for compliance with the IMF prescriptions, as suggested by Table 6a . We did not find significant coefficients for the proxies tv, g, and xv. As indicated in Ta ble 6b, we fail to find a sig nificant coefficient for the BOP variable mr indicating that the BOP situation is not relevant for the decision to resist or not IMF policies. It suggests that the set of causes influencing the decision to resort to the Fund is di fferent fr om the one whieh is relevant for the choice between resisting or obeying the IMF policies. The BOP situation is relevant for the decision to go to the Fund but does not seem to be important for the choice between resistance and obedience.
Next we consider only one dependent variable (y) with a larger image set leading to the multinomial logit exercises. Ta ble 7a presents the relevant results. The income concentration and the external shock coefficients are si gnificantly different from zero and have the expected signs. Now we get a higher t-statistic for ty with the expected sign and we cannot reject that the coefficient is different from zero.20 We get the wrong signs for xy and for g.
Testing the political-regime hypothesis
Authoritarian regimes are often assumed to be docile to the IMF (Payer (1974) and Phillips (1983) ). The evidence of Table 5b does not 18For a more detailed report of the results obtained in this and in the following sections, see Oliveira (1989) . 19 Although 'the result is sensitive to introducing other plausible variables and a constant. 2 0 The alternative hypothesis being that it is greater than zero at the 5% signifi· cance level. deny such possibility; the dummy coefficient for political regime turns out to be significant (although barely). 2l However, as we move to the implementation of IMF programs, the results are unfavorable for the political-regime hypothesis. We do not get a significant result using the dependent variable R as indicated in Ta ble 6c. Interestingly, when the t-statistic docs turn out to be higher, as in the case of the multinomial logit of Ta ble 7b, the sign is positive, suggesting a positive association between authoritarianism and resistance.
From the above evidence one might conjecture about a possible (and rather provocative) interpretation for the influence of the po litical regime in the choices under discussion. Authoritarian regimes seem to resort more often to the Fund but they also tend to resist the Fund policies. But considering the lack of robustness of the results as well as the historical experience, a common sense conclusion seems to be more accurate. Political regime seems to be just too ample a variable to explain any sort of specifi c behavior towards multilateral organizations or stabilization.
Next we turn to the nested logit. With respect to our previous working hypotheses, we are going to focus on the income concentra tion and on the magnitude of the external shock (ic and b, respec tively) for which more robust results were obtained thus far.
The nested logit
Given the distinction between the decisions of resorting or not to the Fund and the one of obeying or not the IMF policies, we can hypothesize the choice configuration indicated in Diagram 1. In a world without implementational problems every country that went to the IMF would obey. The potentially disobedient cases would never sign high-conditionality agreements. This would correspond to the Diagram la l ). The other extreme would be a world of perva sive implementational problems in which every country under IMF high-conditionality agreement would resist IMF policy prescriptions. This is depicted in Diagram la 2 . We assume that an intermediate picture is more representative of the real world. Unfortunately, we cannot observe how the countries which did not go to the IMF behave with respect , to resistance. All we see is alternative I in Diagram Ib).
21The high correlation between pr and mr make the dispersion of the estimates large.
But we observe both resistance and obedience of the countries which went to the Fund. In fact, resistance on the part of the countries is not pervasive but is significant as illustrated by Ta ble 2. There fore it is important to distinguish between the two decisions involved and investigate the set of causes behind each of them. The Brazil ian historical experience as well as the previous simple logits suggest that BOP variables explain the choice between F (agreement with the IMF) and NF (non agreement with the IMF), where structural factors are behind the decision between R (resistance) and 0 (obedi ence).
The discussion about different trees of choices permits some as sessment about possible improvements in conditionality enforcement. The question can be seen as one for how "close" or how similar to each other the choices R and 0 arc. Indeed, the tree choices for y (see Table 1 ) could be treated as if the assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) held for each pair of choices. For example, if R were ruled out for some reason (assume perfect mon itoring by the international organizations), the probabilities of N F and 0 would increase proportionally, leaving their ratio unchanged. This is the assumption behind the simple multinomial logit. The corresponding decision tree is indicated in the Diagram 2a).
Alternatively, we may partially raise the IIA assumption by "nesting" the implementational decision within the Fund alternative. Presumably, the decision between Rand 0 can be included into the Fund choice. In this case, the ratio of the probabilities of R and o would not be affected by the probability of going or not to the Fund. If a severe BOP crisis hits all LDCs they all have to resort to the Fund, thereby ruling out the N F alternative. The ratio of probabilities of Rand 0 would remain unchanged, preserving the IIA assumption within the "nest" . However, in the previous perfect monitoring case, excluding the R alternative would alter the ratio of the probabilities of 0 and N F. Rand 0 would be sufficiently sim ilar alternatives in this case as to lead to a more than proportional increase in the probability of obedience relatively to the probability of N F. In other words, stricter monitoring of the program targets could make conditionality enforcement more effective. In terms of the IIA assumption, in the so-called "nested logit" it holds within each subset of alternatives but not among the different subsets. Di-agram 2b) presents the correspondent tree of choices. There is no a priori reason to assume one structure over the other. In fact, the two Specifi cations turn out to be observationally equivalent, as discusse<! later.
The structure and results of the nested logit Assume the stochastic utility functions, where Uij is country i utility function associated with choice j, where, i = 1, 2,3· ·· 4 3 countries; j = 1, 2,3 corresponding to NF, Rand 0, respectively; and eij is an unobservable random variable.
Using Macfadden (1979) and MacFadden (1981) as discussed in Amemiya (1985) , consider that, contrary to the simple logit model of the previous section, the errors arc correlated and the following bivariate distribution can be assumed (we drop the subscript i for convenience; iv is the "inclusive value")
and F(el) = exp(-exp(-el)), where 1 < iv < 1.
It can be shown that
The expressions for the probabilities associated with each choice can be calculated from the stochastic utility functions suggested above. The probability of not going to the Fund becomes
and the conditional probability of resistance is,
an analogous expression holding for the obedience choice (y = 3).
Thus the probability of not going to the Fund (y=l) can be shown to be, P( y = 1 ) = exp(u1)/(exp(u1) + ((exp( u2 / iv) + exp( u 3/iv)) i V) (1) and the conditional probabilities of the two choices of the lower branch of the tree become, P(y = 2 1 Y '11) = exp(u2/ iv)/(exp(u2 / iv) + exp(u3/ iv)) (2) P(y = 31 y '11) = exp(u3/ iv )/(exp(u2/iv) + exp(u3/ iv)) (3) where Ui is the revealed utility of the choice i ( i = 1, 2 ,3) and iv is the "inclusive value" coefficient. 22
The above probabilities can be seen as binary logit models. The upper branch of the Diagram 2 b contains a choice between not going to the IMF and a weighted average between resisting and obeying IMF prescriptions, which represents the choice of going to the Fund. The lower branch is depicted as a logit for the choice between resisting and obeying, which is "nested" into the Fund option.
The correlation between e 2 and e3 indicated above is convenient because it permits discriminating between the two structures of Di agram 2 and, in accordance with the previous discussion, evaluating the degree of similarity between the choices Rand O. If, for exam ple, iv = 1, corr( e2, e3 ) = 0 which means that alternatives 2 and 3 are dissimilar, IIA holds, the simple logit is the right structure andmore important for our purpose -stricter monitoring on the part of the mult I lateral authority may lead to more effective conditionality enforcement. The inclusive value coefficient can thus be interpreted as a measure of the similarity between the observed choices at the lower level of the tree structure.
The next step is to relate the non stochastic components of the utility functions to the factors of resistance found to be relevant in the previous section.
"See AmeInlya (1985, p.301-302) for a proof.
a) The arguments of the revealed utility fu nctions
We assume that countries make the choices involved in the above tree structure based on the following variables: mr -import coverage in terms of months; b -magnitude of favorable external shocks; ic -income conccntration; 2 3
The first argument reflects the liquidity situation of a country which is assumed to be crucial for the decision of resorting or not to the Fund. The Brazilian experience of only incurring the political cost of going to the IMF in case of unsustainable BOP imbalances seems to be representative of LDCs. Then the revealed preference of not resorting to the Fund (ul) can be expressed as a function of the import coverage:
Deciding to resort to the Fund need not mean obedience to the Fund policies, as also suggested by the Brazilian experience and the previous simple logit exercises. The decision is dependent upon the extent to which the stabilization problems are related to external shocks and the seriousness of the existing income inequality. These two factors are captured by the variables b and ie, respectively,
Estimation will proceed in two stages. First, we estimate the co efficients of the factors affecting the conditional probability of resist ing the IMF policies. Second, we use those estimates in the estimation of the inclusive value coefficient, iv, and of the BOP coefficient, all.
I stage
23See appendix and Ta ble 1 for sources and definitions of the variables mentioned in the text.
The conditional probability models can be reduced to functions of the difference between the revealed utilities of resisting and obey ing and the parameter iv. For instance, take the expression for the conditional probability of resistance (equation (2)), and divide all the terms by exp(u2/iv)24 to obtain,
where c13 = a13/iv, c12 == a12/iv, c23 == a23/iv and c22 == a22/iv, and u32 = (c13 -c12) * ic + (c23 -c22) * b, and u23 == -u32.
Analogously,
It is possible to estimate the lower-branch parameters c13, c12, c23 and c22 by using a simple logit structure and maximum likelihood estimators (MLE). Given the sample choices between alternatives 2 and 3, the log-likelihood function (1/23) would be 1/23 = d2 * 10g(P(y = 21Y t= 1)) + d3 * 10g(P(y = 31y t= 1)) or, 1/23 = d2 * (-log(l + exp( u32)) + d3 * (-log(l + exp ( u23)) where di = i if y = i and zerO otherwise.
II stage (9)
The marginal probability of not going to the Fund can be reduced to a function of (u2 -ui), (u3 -ui), and iv. Dividing by exp(ul) all the terms of the expression for P(y = 1) above (equation (1)),
Using the MLE of stage I for c13, c23, c12 and c22 we can es timate the MLE of all an iv. The log-likelihood function will now be where and l/23 = d1 * (-log(l + (exp(u21) + exp(u31)) i V)) ..
, the log-likelihood function can be expressed as, 2 5
Finally we use the estimates of all and iv and the lower-branch estimates of the I stage in a simultaneous estimation of all the pa rameters of the model. Table 8 reports the relevant results. Two findings are notewor thy. First, at the 10% significance level, one cannot reject the hy pothesis that the inclusive value coefficient is in the unit interval. Neither can one reject the hypothesis that iv = 1, in which case the independence of irrelevant assumptions would hold and the simple logit structure of the last section would be the appropriate one.
c) Results of the nested logit
Second, as in the case of the simple binary and multinomial logits, the coefficients for the external shock and income distribution variables (c12 and c22, respectively) continue to be found significant (although barely) and with the expected signs.
Conclusion.
The success of an IMF program does not seem to depend ex clusively on the adequacy of the stabilization approach applied. The indicator of resistance to IMF programs proposed in this study sug gests that although not pervasively present, implementation problems are significant. Willingness to stabilize on the part of the member countries seems to be a crucial factor. There is not a simple relation between the signature of a high-conditionality agreement and com mitment with stabilization. Countries may resort to the higher-credit tranches without truly committing themselves to macro discipline.
The logit model applied to a data set of 43 countries suggests that such resistance may be associated with the magnitude of the recent external shocks and with the degree of income concentration. This result obtains with different definitions for the dependent variable (in the binary and the multinomial logits) and different assumptions about the IIA hypothesis (in the simple and nested logits). We failed to reject the hypothesis of zero coefficients for the other three vari ables assumed to be relevant: recession aversion, fiscal weakness and the degree of openness.
Although the investigation focuses on the resistance to IMF pro grams the conclusions can to a certain extent be extrapolated to other types of plans given the structural nature of the income concentra tion variable. The Brazilian systematic resistance regardless of IMF sponsorship is again illustrative.
The results obtained here justify a few comments about the re lated literature. First, the association between IMF compliance and political regime which is found in Payer (1974) and Phillips (1983) does not hold. Considering the dummy coefficient for the regime type, there seems to be a positive association between authoritar ian regimes and the likelihood of going to the IMF, but the result is not robust. However, as we turn to the implementation aspect we observe a positive relation between authoritarianism and resistance which contradicts the political-regime hypothesis. Rather than pro viding any sort of causal link between resistance and political regime, it is important to realize that the political regime is simply too broad of a dimension to explain any particular type of behavior towards multilateral organizations.
Second, the fact that IMF plans tend not to be fully implemented docs challenge the conclusions of Pastor (1987) about the presumed impact of such programs. A similar point had already been made in Remmer (1986) although corrections in the way resistance was measured in that study are in order. Third, the results confi rm the importance of the income concen tration as in Berg and Sachs (1988) but relate it directly to resistance, the latter being defi ned in a specifi c way as resistance to the IMF pro grams.
In terms of policy recommendations, the results do not provide an easy cure to the resistance to the IMF prescriptions. Since the simple logit structure cannot be rejected, a greater effort to enforce IMF targets could simply cause a smaller frequency of IMF programs. It is not clear that the IMF can in fact solve the moral hazard problem involved in the relation between a sovereign debtor and a private creditor.
In turn, at the national level, both variables found to be rele vant for the likelihood of resistance are not under the policy makers' control. Besides the obvious case of the magnitude of the external shock, the short run rigidity of the personal income distribution is a well-known stylized fact of Development Economics.
It is necessary to bear in mind the limitations of the above ex ercise. Three qualifi cations arc particularly pertinent. First, the question of how resistance is affected by the lack of adequacy of the stabilization package is not addressed here. 2 6 Second, due to the lack of data for several countries, the sample size is limited. 2 7 Third, given the qualitative nature of the variables involved, the choice of proxies and/or definitions to each argument is not clear-cut. Thus, the above results should suggest clues for further qualitative and his torical comparisons rather than substitute for them. tt is the index for the average terms of trade in 1979-86 having 1973-78 as the base period. We used the "Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics" of the Unctad as the source for the terms of trade. For a few cases not available in the Unctad study, we constructed a terms-of-trade index using IFS data. ri is the reciprocal of the international interest rate. We used the prime rate as a proxy.
ic -income concentration -percentage of household income held by the highest 10% in the distribution. The sources are Taylor and Jodice (1983, p.134/135 ) except for Ireland, Israel and Spain whose percentages were taken fr om the World Development Report. The unavailability of this indicator for several countries consisted on the binding constraint for the sample size.
Ta ble A.l shows the values of the above variables for the 43 countries of our sample.
B. The Maximum-Likelihood Estimation of the Logit Model
We discussed the nested logit in detail in the text. Although the simple logit is a specific case of the nested logit (one in which the ·inclusive value, iv, is one), some comments may clarify the procedure.
We do not observe the probabilities of a country making a certain choice with respect to the IMF. Only the actual choices made are available. We then assume a logistic probability that choice i was made,
where X is the vector of independent variables and b is the vector of coefficients to be estimated.
The maximization of the likelihood function (usually in log, like the ones in the text) provides parameter estimator of b such that the likelihood of the choice pattern of the sample is maximized. The MLE are consistent and efficient asymptotically. They are asymptotically normal allowing us to perform the t-statistic tests.
We used TSP version 4.1 for the Logit procedure. For the algebra involved in the conditional probability expres sions and the logliklihood fu nction, see Oliveira (1989) . 
